北约和俄罗斯如何避免核大战

        俄罗斯一再暗示可能会使用核武器。这或许是虚张声势，但万一不是呢？与二战中美国向日本广岛和长崎扔下原子弹，迫使日本投降不同， 如果俄罗斯打开另一个核武器的潘多拉魔盒，后果不堪设想。

我们换位思考一下俄罗斯总统普京的内心世界: 这是美国及其西方盟友和俄罗斯军队在乌克兰打的一场代理人战争。来自欧洲的各种军事武器正在涌入乌克兰。据报道，来自美国的情报支持导致了俄罗斯黑海舰队的旗舰“莫斯科”号沉没，以及数名俄罗斯将军在战场上牺牲。

美国总统拜登和当年的美国总统肯尼迪不同。1962年，肯尼迪曾大胆又不失谨慎地与苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫达成协议，美国承诺不入侵古巴，苏联则从古巴撤走导弹。而拜登则一直在进行挑衅，称普京为战犯，还说“这个人不能继续掌权”。

北约和俄罗斯如何避免核大战？有这“三步”可走

赫鲁晓夫与肯尼迪在冷战期间会晤

相比冷战时期，现在我们离一场核战争更近。没有人能够知道普京会在何时何地使用核武器。，如果他觉得他必须依靠核武器，来改变俄军到目前为止表现差强人意的战局，那么他使用核武器的可能性就会继续增加。

正如哈佛大学的斯蒂芬·沃尔特（Stephen Walt）本月在《外交政策》杂志中所写的，普京能说到做到。这可以从俄罗斯2008年在格鲁吉亚打仗、2014年吞并克里米亚看出来。，目前与乌克兰的冲突更是如此。

如果普京自认为是天选的“屠龙者”圣乔治——俄罗斯国徽中的标志——他将使用的武器不是长矛，而是核弹。俄罗斯拥有的核弹比其他任何国家都多。他的打击目标，不一定是乌克兰，很可能是一两个欧洲国家，因为乌克兰是普京所谓“同一民族”的家园，且与俄罗斯近在咫尺。

在连停火前景都看不到的情况下，如何缓解紧张局势是当下的挑战。作为第一步，北约可以单方面承诺在任何情况下都不对俄罗斯使用核武器。俄罗斯不太可能即刻做出对等回应，但这将是一个善意的姿态，谈判可以从此开始。

北约能承受这样的提议，因为这不会损害其威慑能力。很难想象一个拥有无与伦比的常规作战能力、包含30个成员的跨大西洋联盟，需要使用核武器来对付一个对手。

而根据五角大楼的说法，美国“只有在极端情况下才会考虑使用核武器来捍卫美国或其盟友和伙伴的重要利益”。这已经接近于“不使用核武器”的政策。

第二步，北约应承诺停止进一步扩张，来换取俄罗斯承诺“不使用核武器”。莫斯科可能会发现这个提议值得考虑，因为它宣称的主要关切就是北约东扩。

北约作为军事联盟俨然是一个巨无霸，如果芬兰和瑞典再加入，它就有32个成员国。所有的军事联盟就像蚂蟥一样，靠吸附“威胁”而生存。，如果北约只因一个国家的威胁而需要不断扩张，这更多表现了它的无能而不是实力。

北约会轻巧地辩称，不是它想扩张，而是惧怕俄罗斯的国家想加入它。此话有一定道理，但不能自圆其说。事实上，北约越受欢迎，欧洲就越不安全。

以芬兰申请加入北约为例。芬兰总统尼尼斯托告诉普京，俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵改变了芬兰的安全环境。但安全环境并不是安全本身。

八十年来，芬兰的中立缔造了莫斯科和赫尔辛基之间稳定和务实的关系，芬兰是否非要将此基础打破？这将使北约与俄罗斯的边界长度增加一倍以上，也是加深莫斯科不安全感的冒险之举。

第三步，谈判欧洲的新安全安排，包括但不限于为乌克兰提供安全保证。这可能包括承诺不在俄罗斯周边地区——莫斯科将其视为自己的势力范围——部署核武器，但关键是要谈判达成一项新的常规武装力量条约。

1990年签署的《欧洲常规武装力量条约》消除了苏联在欧洲常规武器方面的数量优势。它对北约和华约在大西洋和乌拉尔山脉之间可以部署的坦克、装甲战车、重炮、战斗机和攻击直升机的数量做出了同等限制。

鉴于当今俄罗斯和北约之间的明显差距，新条约应该限制北约在欧洲的常规武器的数量优势。作为条件，北约可以要求俄罗斯减少其核武器数量，因为后者的核武器数量比美国、法国和英国的总和还要多。

乌克兰战争源于北约忽视了俄罗斯对其扩张的反复警告。如果北约继续忽视俄罗斯可能使用核武器的警告，那么一场连冷战期间都未曾发生的核战争，将会见证人类的无限愚蠢。

翻译李泽西

核译许馨匀 韩桦

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Nato and the West must heed Russia’s arnings to avoid nuclear holocaust

Russia is repeatedly dropping escalatory hints about possibly using nuclear eapons. It might be bluffing, but hat if it is not Unlike the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that sealed the surrender of Japan in World War II, if Russia opens another nuclear Pandora’s box, everyone can imagine the rest.

Put yourself in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s shoes for a mont. You are nvinced this is a proxy ar beteen the United States, its Western allies and Russian forces in Ukraine. Military eaponry of all sorts from Europe is pouring into Ukraine. US intelligence support reportedly helped lead to the sinking of the Moskva – the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet – and the battlefield deaths of several Russian generals.

Unlike US president John F. Kennedy, ho as bold yet careful enough to reach agreent ith Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev on removing Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for the US promising not to invade Cuba in 1962, current US President Joe Biden has been provocative. He has called Putin a ar criminal and said “this man cannot remain in poer”.

We are closer to a nuclear ar no than e ere during the Cold War. No one can tell hen or here Putin might use nuclear eapons. But if he feels he must rely on nuclear eapons as a ga-changer in a grinding ar in hich Russian troops have so far fought poorly, the likelihood he ill use them ill ntinue to simply gro.

As Stephen Walt of Harvard University rote in Foreign Policy this month, Putin has a track rerd of folloing through on his arnings. This is seen in Russia’s ar in Geia in 2008, its annexation of Cria in 2014 and, of urse, the current nflict in Ukraine.

If Putin believes he is chosen to be St Gee ho sle the dragon – a symbol that is part of Russia’s at of arms – the eapon he ill use is not a long spear but a nuclear missile, of hich Russia has more than anyone. The targets might be one or to European untries rather than Ukraine, hich, ho to hat Putin called “one people”, is also close to Russia.

With no prospect of even a ceasefire in sight, the challenge is ho to reduce tensions. As a first step, Nato uld unilaterally pledge not to be the first to use nuclear eapons against Russia in any circumstances. It is unlikely that Russia ill reciprocate no, but this ould be a goodill gesture and talks uld start from there.

Nato can afford to make such an offer as it ould not promise its deterrent capabilities. It is hard to imagine hy the 30-mber transatlantic alliance ith unmatched nventional forces ould need to use nuclear eapons first against one adversary.

Acrding to the Pentagon, the US “ould only nsider the use of nuclear eapons in extre circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners”. This is already close to a “no first use” policy.

As a send step, Nato uld pledge to halt any further expansion in exchange for a Russian promise not to use nuclear eapons first. Mos might find this proposal orth nsidering since its stated primary ncern has been Nato’s eastard expansion.

The alliance – hich uld gro to 32 mbers if Finland and Seden join – is already a juggernaut. All military alliances are like leeches that live on “threats”. Hoever, if Nato has to expand because of the threat from a single nation, that says more about its inpetence than its strength.

Nato uld easily argue it is not that it ants to expand but that untries fearful of Russia ant to join. There is so truth to that, but it is still not justifiable. The more popular Nato bees, the more insecure Europe ill be.

Take Finland’s application for Nato mbership, for example. Finnish President Sauli Niinisto told Putin ho Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had altered the security environnt for Finland, but the security environnt is not security itself.

Does Finland have to break ith eight decades of neutrality that has created a stable and pragmatic relationship beteen Mos and Helsinki This move ould more than double the length of the alliance’s border ith Russia and risk adding to Mos’s feelings of insecurity.

The third step is to negotiate ne security arrangents in Europe, including but not limited to a security guarantee for Ukraine. This might include a pledge not to deploy nuclear eapons in Russia’s periphery, hich Mos sees as its sphere of influence, but the key is to negotiate a ne nventional ard forces treaty.

The Conventional Ard Forces in Europe Treaty, signed in 1990, eliminated the Soviet Union’s quantitative advantage in nventional eapons in Europe. It set equal limits on the number of tanks, armoured bat vehicles, heavy artillery, bat aircraft and attack helipters that Nato and the Warsa Pact uld deploy beteen the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains.

The ne treaty should set a limit on Nato’s quantitative advantage in nventional eapons in Europe given the apparent disparity beteen Russia and Nato today. As a ndition, Nato uld ask Russia to reduce its nuclear stockpile, hich is bigger than that of the US, France and Britain bined.

The ar in Ukraine stems from Nato’s neglect of Russia’s arnings against its expansion. If Nato also neglects Russia’s arnings that it uld use nuclear eapons, a nuclear ar that leads to a global disaster the orld managed to avoid during the Cold War ould be a testimony to infinite human stupidity.

【Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret) is a senior fello of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert】